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ABSTRACT
On Kickstarter only 36% of crowdfunding campaigns suc-
cessfully raise sufficient funds for their projects. In this pa-
per, we explore the possibility of redistribution of crowdfund-
ing donations to increase the chances of success. We de-
fine several intuitive redistribution policies and, using data
from a real crowdfunding platform, LaunchGood, we assess
the potential improvement in campaign fundraising success
rates. We find that an aggressive redistribution scheme can
boost campaign success rates from 37% to 79%, but such
choice-agnostic redistribution schemes come at the cost of
disregarding donor preferences. Taking inspiration from of-
fline giving societies and donor clubs, we build a case for
choice-preserving redistribution schemes that strike a balance
between increasing the number of successful campaigns and
respecting giving preference. We find that choice-preserving
redistribution can easily achieve campaign success rates of
48%. Finally, we discuss the implications of these differ-
ent redistribution schemes for the various stakeholders in the
crowdfunding ecosystem.
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INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding provides individuals and organizations with
the opportunity to raise funds for innovative projects, char-
itable causes, or public services. By raising the visibility of
these fund-raising campaigns to Internet scale, crowdfunding
sites like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Donorschoose dramat-
ically increase the pool of potential backers and chances of
successful fund-raising. Despite this potential, most crowd-
funding campaigns still fail to reach their funding goals. On
Kickstarter, the largest crowdfunding platform, only 36% of
the campaigns, were successfully funded in 2016 [10].
In the prevalent all-or-nothing funding model, campaigns that
fail to meet their funding goals receive none of the contribu-
tions: even if a campaign attracts 99% of its funding goal, it
will not be funded. Currently, 1445 Kickstarter campaigns are
unsuccessful, despite having raised 81-99% of their goal [10].
In contrast, campaigns that exceed their goals keep all con-
tributions; ‘Exploding Kittens’ and ‘Pebble’ raised 87,825%
and 4,067% of their funding goals respectively. This raises
the question: can we redistribute contributions to success-
fully fund more campaigns?
Clearly, a redistribution where excess funds from over-funded
campaigns are given to under-funded ones, can lead to an
overall increase in successful campaigns. A naı¨ve redistribu-
tion, however, can be detrimental to both the overall quality
of campaigns and to the degree of funding. For example, if
campaign organizers believe that extra funds will eventually
be redistributed in their favor, they may be less motivated to
produce higher quality campaigns; if funders think their do-
nations could end up backing campaigns that they do not like,
they may not be willing to contribute.
Therefore, redistribution must be done carefully. Consider,
a donor, Sandy, who backs three simultaneous campaigns.
Assuming that Sandy wishes all three campaigns to succeed
regardless of how other donors give, she may be willing to
accept a redistribution of her funds across the three cam-
paigns if it allows them to meet their funding goal. She is
less likely to accept a redistribution that allocates her funds
to other campaigns that she does not support. Redistribu-
tion schemes may either honor Sandy’s giving preferences,
by only redistributing her funds among the campaigns she
has contributed to (choice-preserving redistribution schemes)
or ignore Sandy’s preferences and redistribute funds to any
active campaign (choice-agnostic redistribution schemes).
In this paper we explore several possible crowdfunding do-
nation redistribution schemes. We begin by defining sev-
eral archetypes that represent intuitive redistribution policies
( §Redistribution Schemes ). We then analyze the potential
improvements to efficiency — measured in terms of cam-
paigns successfully funded1 — achievable by these redistri-
bution schemes using real crowdfunding data from Launch-
Good. We find that an aggressive choice-agnostic redistribu-
tion can boost campaign success rates from 37% to 79%, but
such a policy comes at the cost of completely ignoring donor
preferences. We build a case for choice-preserving redistribu-
tion policies that strike a balance between increasing success-
ful campaigns from 37% to 48% and respecting giving pref-
erences ( §Results ). Finally, we discuss the potential impli-
cations of various redistribution policies when implemented
on crowdfunding platforms ( §Discussion ). We contextualize
1Viewing crowdfunding platforms as online markets where the goal
is to match donor contributions to successful campaigns, the per-
centage of successful campaigns within a platform is a good approx-
imation of its efficiency [17].
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our work within the existing research on crowdfunding plat-
forms that aim to improve success outcomes for campaigns
and platforms ( §Background ).
BACKGROUND
The goal of all crowdfunding platforms is generally the same:
to match a campaign’s needs with funding from donors. Cam-
paigns are only successful if a sufficient number of donors
coordinate to contribute to a project.
Crowdfunding Mechanisms
Crowdfunding campaigns are often used to fund discrete pub-
lic goods that require a certain amount of money to be raised
to be useful [2, 7, 17]. Kickstarter employs an all-or-nothing
model or return rule where a project collects money only if
the funding goal is met. The contrasting model supported by
IndieGoGo is a keep-it-all or direct donation model where
donations are retained even if the funding goal is not met.
These crowdfunding mechanisms have been shown to have a
significant impact on donor perceptions of campaigns, donor
willingness to contribute, and the eventual success of cam-
paigns [5, 17].
Specifically, Wash and Solomon showed through a series of
controlled experiments that the return rule increases donors’
willingness to donate to riskier projects and thus more accu-
rately reflects individual preferences rather than the funding
of projects that are more likely to be funded [17]. However,
while more projects are successfully funded through the re-
turn rule, this benefit comes with a reduction in efficiency
when individuals donate to their own preferences rather than
those of the crowd.
These results motivate our work on understanding whether
mechanisms like redistribution can simultaneously increase
the number of successfully funded projects while respecting
individual preferences.
Social Proof and Coordination
Crowdfunding campaigns rely heavily on social proof. Dis-
playing information like total funds raised and the number of
donors can signal to the individual the collective valuation of
the crowd. Participation by other donors signals the quality
and credibility of the campaign, removes apprehensions, pro-
vides evidence of reciprocity, and establishes norms for how
much to donate. These signals provide critical evidence that
helps donors coordinate around supporting high value cam-
paigns [13, 4].
Unfortunately, crowdfunding platforms do not always give
donors accurate information about the crowd’s beliefs [15]:
the crowd’s valuation of a project induced by donation
amounts on crowdfunding sites may be (i) delayed, (ii) mis-
represented, or (iii) overshadowed by other projects [15, 1,
16].2 As a result, campaigns can fail to reach their funding
2Solomon et al. show that highly successful star projects can actu-
ally hinder other projects [16].
goal and the overall distribution of donations may not resem-
ble the crowd’s actual valuations. Codo [3] is one crowd-
funding system that can potentially mitigate this issue by al-
lowing individual donors to make independent valuations that
are stipulated on the crowd’s valuations.
In relation to these works, donation redistribution can be con-
strued as a coordination of donors’ funds.
Improving Outcomes
Recent research investigated several different factors influ-
encing crowdfunding outcomes. Gerber et al. describe the
motivations of both campaign organizers and donors for us-
ing crowdfunding as a fundraising tool [6]. Hui et al. explore
the role that a crowdfunding project’s community can play in
its success [9]. It has also been demonstrated that the use of
persuasive language [12] and status updates [18] can influ-
ence the chances of crowdfunding success.
Social networks can also be leveraged to increase donations.
A donation request or tagging from family or others who
have donated can increase individual contributions [4]. So-
cial networks can be used by organizers to improve fundrais-
ing outcomes if the existing networks can be activated and
expanded [8]. Finally, the timing of donations is a factor that
affects donations [15], and donors are more willing to donate
more to projects that are nearing completion [11].
Real crowdfunding sites use a variety of incentives for donors
to donate. Direct inducements include gifts, stretch goals,
early access, and even equity.
Our work explores several possible automated reallocation
schemes that can improve outcomes for both campaign orga-
nizers and donors.
Redistribution in the Wild
Giving societies or donor clubs are organizations that explic-
itly gather funds from donors and allocates them toward spe-
cific projects. These giving societies are usually unified under
high-level causes (e.g., education, environmental conserva-
tion, etc.). In this manner, the donation process is re-framed
from being a highly personal choice to a collective action.
The donor slightly relaxes their personal autonomy to de-
fer to the valuations and expertise of the collective. Giving
clubs fit within our choice-preserving redistribution schemes
as donors implicitly agree to a redistribution of their funds
across the subset of campaigns managed by the giving club.
Donorschoose is a crowdfunding site focused on education
that specifically targets high-poverty public schools to in-
crease classroom engagement. Success rates are relatively
high on DonorsChoose (≈ 74%). Projects are vetted by the
website staff and funds to an unsuccessful project are not re-
funded, but repurposed. Donors can choose alternate projects
to fund instead or allow the platform operators or the teacher
whose campaign was unsuccessful to repurpose the funds as
she sees fit. We compare repurposing to other redistribution
effects.
EMPIRICAL CASE FOR FUND REDISTRIBUTION
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In this section, we describe how we implement and analyze
two classes of redistribution schemes: choice-agnostic re-
distribution and choice-preserving redistribution. We study
the efficiency models with real data from the LaunchGood
crowdfunding platform.
The LaunchGood Dataset
LaunchGood is a niche crowdfunding platform focused on
the Muslim community. LaunchGood went live in October
2013. Since its inception, LaunchGood has raised more than
3 million dollars for more than 300 projects. Among its no-
table campaigns are a campaign to rebuild African-American
churches destroyed by arson in 2015 and a campaign to fund
Adnan Syed’s legal team, both raising more than 100,000 dol-
lars.
We analyze LaunchGood’s entire donation trace since its in-
ception. We eliminate active campaigns from our analysis
(i.e. campaigns whose end date is after our snapshot date of
January, 2016) and campaigns that remained live for more
than seven days after their end date3. LaunchGood keeps
track of offline contributions made by anonymous donors di-
rectly to the campaign organizers. We cannot redistribute
these funds as they are not raised through the platform.
Figure 1 illustrates the number of active campaigns per
month. Figure 2 charts the distribution of campaign goals.
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Figure 1: Number of active campaigns per month.
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Figure 2: A dot-plot of campaign goals. The mean campaign goal
marked with the vertical black line is 19,517 USD.
Property
Total number of campaigns 228
Distinct donors 7935
Repeat donors 1342
Percentage of repeat donors 16.9%
Average campaigns backed per repeat donor 3.7
Maximum campaigns backed per repeat donor 142
Average time interval between consecutive donations 96 days
Average life span of a campaign 44 days
Table 1: Summary Statistics for LaunchGood’s Campaigns & Donors.
3It is difficult to determine whether campaigns overlap, if they have
no set end date.
Redistribution Schemes
We analyze four redistribution schemes broadly classi-
fied into choice-agnostic redistribution or choice-preserving
redistribution schemes. Choice-agnostic redistribution
schemes allow a donor’s contributions to be redistributed to
any campaign within the platform. These include naı¨ve redis-
tribution and repurposing schemes. Choice-preserving redis-
tribution schemes only shuffle a donor’s contributions within
the set of campaigns the donor contributed to. These include
both unordered- and ordered- choice-preserving redistribu-
tion schemes. With ordering, choice-preserving redistribu-
tion ensures that if a donor contributes more to one campaign
over another then even after a redistribution, he/she would
still contribute more to that campaign.
We formally define each of these schemes within the frame-
work of an optimization problem where the goal is to maxi-
mize the number of campaigns that meet their goals.
Let n be the number of distinct donors that donated on the
LaunchGood platform and m be the number of distinct cam-
paigns.
We represent an actual contribution a donor i ∈ 1, ..., n made
to a campaign j ∈ 1, ...,m with Ai, j. A campaign, j, has a
fund-raising goal of G j. We represent whether a campaign
has met its goal with a success indicator variable, I j.
I j =
1, if
n∑
i=1
Ai, j ≥ G j
0, otherwise
Every campaign has a start date s j and an end date e j. Each
contribution Ai, j is made on a specific date4 di, j: s j ≤ di, j ≤ e j.
After a redistribution of funds, we denote the donation a
donor i makes to a campaign j with Ri, j. We now represent
whether a campaign meets its goal with another success indi-
cator variable, I′j.
I′j ≤
∑n
i=1 Ri, j
G j
Our redistribution goal is to maximize the number of success-
ful projects,
max
m∑
j=1
I′j
All four schemes must satisfy the following three constraints.
[ALL1] Once a winner, always a winner: If a campaign
met its goal without redistribution, a redistribution of funds
should not cause this campaign to fail.
∀ j, I′j ≥ I j
[ALL2] Fixed Budget: Each donor cannot give more than
the sum of his/her original contributions across all campaigns
4If a donor, i, makes multiple contributions to the same campaign,
j, we encode only one contribution Ai, j equal to the sum of all such
contributions and set di, j equal to the date of the first contribution.
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Figure 3: Each tangerine dot represents the time period between two consecutive donations by the same donor to different campaigns. Each ocean dot
represents the life span of a campaign.
and a donor cannot make a negative contribution.
∀i,
m∑
j=1
Ri, j ≤
m∑
j=1
Ai, j
∀i, j, Ri, j ≥ 0
[ALL3] Redistribute across live, overlapping campaigns:
For each contribution Ai, j made on di, j, we define overlapping
campaigns as follows:
Oi, j = {x : ex ≥ di, j ∧ sx ≤ e j}
The following constraint ensures that we redistribute funds
only within overlapping campaigns.
∀i, j,
∑
i,y∈Oi, j
Ri,y ≤
∑
i,x∈Oi, j
Ai,x
We also try to eliminate the following unfavorable redistribu-
tions with the following optional constraints. We drop these
nice constraints if the optimization problem becomes infeasi-
ble:
[NICE1] Avoid allocating more funds to a previously over-
funded campaign:
∀ j, I j = 1→
n∑
i=1
Ri, j ≤
n∑
i=1
Ai, j
[NICE2] Avoid allocating more funds to a failed cam-
paign: If no redistribution of funds can save a campaign, then
we should not allocate additional funds to that campaign.
∀ j, I′j = 0→
n∑
i=1
Ri, j ≤
n∑
i=1
Ai, j
[NICE3] Avoid surpassing the goal of a previously unsuc-
cessful campaign:
∀ j, I j = 0→
n∑
i=1
Ri, j ≤ G j
Choice-agnostic redistribution
Naı¨ve redistribution
This scheme does not require any additional constraints to the
base constraints listed above.
Repurposing
Repurposing also requires that we only redistribute funds
from failed campaigns. We encode this with the following
constraint:
[REP] Winners keep all:
∀i, j, I j = 1→ Ri, j = Ai, j
No other redistribution scheme imposes the “winners keep
all” constraint.
Choice-preserving redistribution
Our two choice-preserving redistribution schemes must also
ensure the following:
[CP1] No new campaigns: For a given donor, we should
only redistribute his/her funds among the campaigns he/she
contributed to.
∀i, j, Ai, j = 0→ Ri, j = 0
[CP2] Redistribute across live, overlapping campaign
contributions: This constraint tightens the overlap constraints
of naı¨ve and repurposing redistribution schemes to overlap-
ping contributions by the same donor. We redefine overlap-
ping campaign contributions as follows:
Oi, j = {x : ex ≥ di, j ∧ di,x ≤ e j}
Figure 4 visualizes the overlap region of a particular con-
tribution when restricted to a single donor u.
The following constraint ensures that we do not redistribute
funds from a contribution to campaigns that have already
ended or campaigns that the donor contributed to after the
current campaign ended:
∀i, j, Ri, j ≤
∑
x∈Oi, j
Ai,x
Ordered choice-preserving redistribution
Finally, the ordered choice-preserving redistribution scheme
requires the following constraint:
[ORDER] Preserve Preference Ordering: If a donor con-
tributes more funds to one campaign compared to another,
both absolutely and relatively to their respective goals, then a
redistribution of funds should preserve this preference order-
ing.
∀i, x, y, (Ai,x > Ai,y) ∧ (Ai,x/Gx > Ai,y/Gy)→ Ri,x ≥ Ri,y
4
Overlap region for du,2Contributions made by donor u 
to campaigns
s1 e1du,11:
s2 e2du,22:
s3 e3du,33:
s4 e4du,44:
s5 e5du,55:
Figure 4: The contribution made by donor u on du,2 for campaign 2
overlaps with contributions made on du,1 and du,4. For donor u, a redis-
tribution of funds to campaign 2, can only be allowed from contributions
made to campaign 1 and 4.
We relax preference ordering to eliminate contributions to
failed campaigns (i.e. campaigns that do not succeed for any
feasible redistribution) with the following constraint instead:
∀i, x, y, (Ai,x > Ai,y) ∧ (Ai,x/Gx > Ai,y/Gy)
∧ (I′x = 1) ∧ (I′y = 1)→ Ri,x ≥ Ri,y
Results
Table 2 shows the increase in campaigns funded after each
redistribution scheme. Except for a single campaign that was
successfully funded by choice-preserving redistribution and
failed by choice-agnostic redistribution, the set of campaigns
funded by ordered choice-preserving redistribution is a sub-
set of unordered choice-preserving redistribution, which is a
subset of repurposing, which in turn is a subset of naı¨ve re-
distribution.
Projects funded with ...
Original contributions (no redistribution) 85 37%
Choice-agnostic redistribution
Na¨ıve 180 79%
Repurposing 175 77%
Choice-preserving redistribution
Unordered 109 48%
Ordered 99 43%
Table 2: Successful campaigns for each redistribution scheme.
The increase in successful campaigns with choice-preserving
redistribution schemes is low when compared to choice-
agnostic redistribution schemes. Yet, if we consider (i) the
small proportion of repeat donors, roughly 17% of the donor
base (Table 1), (ii) the mean number of campaigns a repeat
donor contributes to, less than 4 campaigns (Table 1), and
(iii) the mean gap between consecutive donations, 96 days, in
relation to the average life span of campaigns, 44 days (Fig-
ure 3), the increases in campaign success brought about by
choice-preserving redistribution are actually fairly surprising.
Trade off: Efficiency vs. Choice
Naturally, choice-agnostic redistribution leads to more effi-
ciency in terms of campaigns meeting their goal than choice-
preserving redistribution.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of choice-agnostic redistri-
bution schemes. With naı¨ve redistribution, almost all over-
funded campaigns lose most of their excess funds. We ob-
serve that repurposing is slightly less efficient than naı¨ve re-
distribution as it allows successful campaigns to keep their
excess funds. This contrasts with the behavior of choice-
preserving redistribution schemes (Figure 6), where only a
few over-funded campaigns lose some of their excess funds,
but donor choices (Fig. 6-top) or ordered preferences (Fig.
6-bottom) are preserved.
In general, our definition of choice-agnostic redistribution fa-
vors campaigns with small goals and disfavors campaigns
with large goals regardless of how much of their goals they
initially raised. The short tail section, the noticeable num-
ber of post-redistribution successful campaigns that initially
raised less than 10% of their goal and the noticeable num-
ber of failed campaigns that initially raised more than 50%
of their goal in Figure 5 illustrate this behavior. Table 3 also
shows that on average choice-agnostic redistribution supports
campaigns that are further from their goal.5
Across ... Average
goal diff. from
goal
All campaigns 19517 11548 (40%)
Only successful campaigns 11221 -1090 (-12%)
Only failed campaigns 24448 19059 (70%)
Only successful campaigns after ... redistribution
Na¨ıve 5749 3580 (66%)
Repurposing 5337 3312 (66%)
Unordered choice-preserving 6429 1357 (34%)
Ordered choice-preserving 6411 1455 (31%)
Table 3: Summary statistics on differences from goal across successful
campaigns under different redistribution schemes.
This behavior is most clearly manifested in one redistribu-
tion outcome where a campaign that raised 97% of its goal
of 26,000 USD, with 800 USD dollars remaining. Both naı¨ve
redistribution and repurposing fail this campaign to support
others. Both choice-preserving redistribution schemes, how-
ever, help this campaign meet its goal.
This may seem like a shortcoming of the optimization objec-
tive, which staunchly maximizes the number of campaigns
funded. This is an artifact of our optimization objective. If
different resolution properties are desired, platform designers
could change the optimization problem to also minimize the
sum of (absolute/percentage) differences reallocated. Design-
ers must also weigh maximizing success against minimizing
differences, where each weight assignment leads to different
outcomes.
Choice-preserving redistribution is biased toward helping
campaigns with multiple donors as they are more likely to
benefit from a redistribution of funds from their supporting
donor base. The average percentage of repeat donors (i.e.
5As a redistribution scheme funds more campaigns the average dif-
ference from the goal naturally increases and becomes closer to the
distribution of differences of failed campaigns with original contri-
butions. Therefore, this measure should be interpreted carefully.
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Figure 5: The behaviour of choice-agnostic redistribution schemes with LaunchGood’s contributions. The tangerine colored bars indicate funds
deducted from a campaign. The ocean colored bars indicate funds allocated to a campaign after redistribution.
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Figure 6: The behaviour of choice-preserving redistribution schemes with LaunchGood’s contributions. The tangerine colored bars indicate funds
deducted from a campaign. The ocean colored bars indicate funds allocated to a campaign after redistribution.
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donors who also donated to other campaigns) per campaign
for the successful campaigns post choice-preserving redistri-
bution is 61-63%. This is much higher than the overall av-
erage percentage of repeat donors per campaign 48% (Table
4). The one campaign that only choice-preserving redistribu-
tion schemes successfully funded had 120 donors, 64 (53%)
of them were repeat donors.
Across ... Average
num. of
donors
num. of
repeat donors
All campaigns 51 22 (48%)
Only successful campaigns 87 35 (47%)
Only failed campaigns 29 14 (49%)
Only successful campaigns after ... redistribution
Na¨ıve 22 11 (50%)
Repurposing 21 11 (50%)
Unordered choice-preserving 47 29 (61%)
Ordered choice-preserving 55 38 (63%)
Table 4: Summary repeat donor statistics across successful campaigns
under different redistribution schemes.
Effect of Donor Acceptance
We simulated the behavior of each scheme under different
donor acceptance ratios as follows: for each acceptance per-
centage p%, we randomly picked p% of the donor popula-
tion to agree to a redistribution of their funds. The remaining
(100 − p)% rejects any redistribution. We generated several
samples for each p% to compute the mean number of suc-
cessful campaigns and the variance for a given p%.
Figure 7a illustrates the effect increasing the number of
donors who accept a redistribution on efficiency.
With choice-agnostic redistribution, an acceptance ratio of
only 10% of the donors can lead to almost half of the im-
provement achievable when all donors accept the redistribu-
tion. In contrast, choice-preserving redistribution leads to a
more gradual improvement as the acceptance ratio increases.
Effect of Organizer Acceptance
As with donor acceptance rates, we also simulated a per-
centage of campaigns organizers accepting a redistribution of
funds to their campaigns, both in terms of outflow and inflow
of funds.
Figure 7b illustrates the effect increasing the number of orga-
nizers who accept a redistribution on efficiency. In this case,
both choice-agnostic redistribution and choice-preserving re-
distribution show the same linear behavior in response to in-
creases of accepting organizers.
DISCUSSION
Even though our empirical analysis shows that redistribution
leads to clear efficiency gains, successfully implementing re-
distribution within a crowdfunding platform is not without
complications. A naı¨ve redistribution scheme can be both ob-
jectionable and detrimental. Taking funds from ‘rich’ cam-
paigns to give to ‘poor’ ones may be seen as unfair and a
violation of donor intentions. Other secondary effects could
also arise. The overall quality of funded campaigns may drop
due to weaker projects being funded. If funders believe their
funds may back projects that they do not deem worthy, they
may also be less likely to contribute. In this section we dis-
cuss these and other challenges. We consider the incentives
from the perspective of donors, campaign organizers, and
platform designers and describe the implications of redistri-
bution.
For Donors
Donors’ reasons and motivations for giving are diverse [6].
Donors are often emotionally invested in the campaigns they
donate to: taking funds from one campaign and giving it to
another may cause donors to feel slighted. Imagine donating
$50 to produce a film you are excited to see only to find that
your funds were redistributed to make a potato salad that you
cannot eat. Crowdfunding platforms could mitigate this reac-
tion through the following approaches: (i) by asking backers
up front whether they are willing to accept a redistribution,
(ii) by respecting their giving preferences or (iii) by orienting
a donor’s mindset toward accepting total utilitarianism. Both
offline giving clubs and DonorsChoose implement variants of
our redistribution schemes and through a combination of the
above approaches.
Within our categorization, offline giving clubs are similar in
spirit to choice-preserving redistribution schemes. Giving
clubs manage several campaigns that share a unified high-
level cause such as education, environmental conservation,
etc.. By re-framing the donation process as a collective ac-
tion rather than an individualistic one, donors indicate their
higher-level preference of the giving club’s overall cause and
either elected members or the majority dictates the distribu-
tion of the collected funds. On an online crowdfunding plat-
form, similar campaigns can be grouped into giving themes
with redistribution schemes automatically allocating funds
across the grouped campaigns.
DonorsChoose implements a repurposing scheme, but is able
to successfully do so through the combination of (i) having
a cohesive theme of education, (ii) integrating redistribution
into the charitable ethos of their platform, and (iii) vetting all
projects.
For Campaign Organizers
The question of reallocation on the part of organizers is sim-
ilarly nuanced. The policy that additional funds given to a
campaign may be reallocated to other (similar) campaigns
may cause organizers to feel cheated of their raised funds.
However, in the case of discrete public goods, the requested
amount is determined by a specific need rather than of ar-
bitrary size. In other words, campaign organizers should
only be requesting the amount that they actually need; if they
wanted to raise more, then they should ask for more initially
since the amount requested for discrete public goods is based
off of a cost estimate.
There are also very practical reasons why reallocation of ex-
cess funds can be good for organizers. The most obvious ben-
efit is if a campaign is unable to raise sufficient funds (over
50% of Kickstarter’s projects [13]), redistribution provides
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(a) The mean increase in funded campaigns as the percentage of donors ac-
cept a redistribution scheme.
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Figure 7: The mean increase in funded campaigns as the percentage of donors (a) or campaigns (b) accept a redistribution scheme. For each acceptance
percentage, we construct random samples of donors (a) or campaigns (b) who accept the redistribution (both in terms of outflow or inflow of funds) to
estimate the variance: the error bars mark one standard deviation from the plotted mean.
such a campaign with a better chance of success. Less obvi-
ously, Mollick et al. found evidence that projects with sub-
stantial (200%) excess funds often deliver worse results than
those that just meet their goals [13]. Kickstarter’s blog posted
a series on how over-funded projects deal with the extra in-
flux of funds [14]; organizers who find themselves in these
situations are generally unprepared and must come up with
strategies on the fly to cope with excess funds.
On the flip side, the existence of reallocation may also entice
project organizers to try and game the system. The risk of
not meeting goals and losing all funds is the same as before
redistribution, but organizers now have an additional chance
to meet their fundraising goal. Thus, organizers have an in-
creased incentive to raise the fundraising goal hoping that re-
allocation provides an additional chance in their favor. These
and other second-order effects and analysis of possible at-
tacks against the system are beyond the scope of this paper.
As with the donor’s interface, the redistribution policy should
be presented up front to the organizers so they can decide
whether this is suited to their needs. DonorsChoose adopts
this approach and further allows the organizers themselves
to decide how to redistribute some of the funds they raised
if they fail. This can give the organizers a sense of control,
even if ultimately the moneys are given to other projects. This
model appears to work well when all projects are vetted.
For the Crowdfunding Designer
As with any site-level changes, the crowdfunding platform
designer must consider a wide-array of issues. These ques-
tions arise from donor and organizer perspectives, but also in
relation to implementation on the site and meta-level impli-
cations for the platform’s brand. Modern crowdfunding cam-
paigns align multiple incentives to motivate donors to con-
tribute, including: progress updates, donor incentives (e.g.
gifts and prizes), entertaining previews, and a sense of com-
munity. How then does redistribution interact with such in-
centives? One possibility is by completely automating the
redistribution process the platform may lose some of the en-
gagement that entices donors to return and give more. It is
likely that there is no “correct” choice, but instead that donors
fall along a spectrum of desired engagement levels.
Another question for crowdfunding designers is: when should
the redistribution be conducted? Immediately after a cam-
paign ends would require the consideration of other cam-
paigns ending at similar times or across certain time win-
dows. Alternatively, having large amounts of idle donations
is wasteful and potentially problematic from the designer’s
standpoint. There are also second-order effects to giving pat-
terns that may emerge. For example, most donations occur at
the start of a campaign and then towards the end of the cam-
paign [15] and it is satisfying for donors to see to a project’s
completion. Will redistribution dampen these effects or could
we redistribute in a manner than enhances them?
Looking at the numbers from DonorsChoose, it is clear that
they have successfully implemented the repurposing redis-
tribution scheme by bringing together several elements that
work well together. Once a crowdfunding platform success-
fully implements redistribution, the benefits could also in-
crease as these policies become the norm. The effects of in-
centives, different ways of incorporating redistribution, and
second-order effects are interesting questions worth examin-
ing in future work.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explore the possibility of redistribution of
crowdfunding donations. We build the case for redistribu-
tion and develop a classification of redistribution models.
We implement these models as a set of constraints within
a campaign-success optimization problem and evaluate their
potential efficiency using data from LaunchGood, an online
crowdfunding platform. We find that a range of redistribution
schemes can provide different levels of benefits in terms of
campaign success rates. We also find redistribution schemes
in the wild and explore how they are able to succeed de-
spite disregarding donor preferences. Finally, we consid-
ered different ways that redistribution mechanisms could be
implemented and integrated within a crowdfunding platform
8
and highlight some of the issues that crowdfunding designers
should consider.
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